Who needs charts anyway?

[Bull94]

I just want to make sure I am understanding this right - USF would go on to score another touchdown later, meaning they would have had the lead whether they went for two or one that situation, it didn't matter. Missing the two point conversion then would have meant they had to go for a second two with the last touchdown to try and go up a field goal. This is exactly why you wait and go for two late in the game when you absolutely have to, there's no way to know what scoring lies ahead with more than half a quarter to go.

Holtz's decision was absolutely vindicated, and we're here blasting it? Amazing. All the legitimate reasons to hate having this guy as a coach, and people feel the need to grasp at straws like this one.

the math says you go for it. it's not subjective.

you may want to stand with a 16 vs a 7 for dealer but it's the wrong move mathematically.

here is a chart that says if you are down by 5 with 9 minutes left you should go for 2 if your probability of making it is better than 17%. down or up 5 is a number that you almost always go for 2.it increases your probability of winning.

http://www.footballcommentary.com/twoptchart.htm

[SANJAY]

If the argument is that he should have ignored the chart because the scoring is not done then I get that and can see why you go that route. But then decline the penalty and move forward with that as your strategy.

I assume moving the ball from the 3 to the 1.5 increases the chances of getting 2 points but there's still a reasonable chance of failing to convert (remember we had been stymied inside the 1yard line earlier). So going for 2 points at the 1.5 yard line still carried the real possibility of failure while now acknowledging that there's more scoring to go on both sides.

[gobulls83]

I just want to make sure I am understanding this right - USF would go on to score another touchdown later, meaning they would have had the lead whether they went for two or one that situation, it didn't matter. Missing the two point conversion then would have meant they had to go for a second two with the last touchdown to try and go up a field goal. This is exactly why you wait and go for two late in the game when you absolutely have to, there's no way to know what scoring lies ahead with more than half a quarter to go.

Holtz's decision was absolutely vindicated, and we're here blasting it? Amazing. All the legitimate reasons to hate having this guy as a coach, and people feel the need to grasp at straws like this one.

the math says you go for it. it's not subjective.

you may want to stand with a 16 vs a 7 for dealer but it's the wrong move mathematically.

here is a chart that says if you are down by 5 with 9 minutes left you should go for 2 if your probability of making it is better than 17%. down or up 5 is a number that you almost always go for 2.it increases your probability of winning.

http://www.footballc.../twoptchart.htm

That's really great, I really care what some random chart you found online says. Not every situation is exactly the same. If it's a 12-7 game where neither team can move the ball, you probably go for it because you are unlikely to score again. It was obvious in the Louisville game that the scoring was not finished, however, so it would be silly to assume a field goal was going to be all USF would need for the rest of the game.

The only thing that is not subjective is that Holtz's thinking was absolutely vindicated. There was no need to go for two there. They did because the penalty moved the ball closer, I don't have an opinion on whether that makes sense - if anyone has numbers on how likely a team is to get it from 18 feet away instead of 36, I'd like to see it.

[Bull94]

I just want to make sure I am understanding this right - USF would go on to score another touchdown later, meaning they would have had the lead whether they went for two or one that situation, it didn't matter. Missing the two point conversion then would have meant they had to go for a second two with the last touchdown to try and go up a field goal. This is exactly why you wait and go for two late in the game when you absolutely have to, there's no way to know what scoring lies ahead with more than half a quarter to go.

Holtz's decision was absolutely vindicated, and we're here blasting it? Amazing. All the legitimate reasons to hate having this guy as a coach, and people feel the need to grasp at straws like this one.

the math says you go for it. it's not subjective.

you may want to stand with a 16 vs a 7 for dealer but it's the wrong move mathematically.

here is a chart that says if you are down by 5 with 9 minutes left you should go for 2 if your probability of making it is better than 17%. down or up 5 is a number that you almost always go for 2.it increases your probability of winning.

http://www.footballc.../twoptchart.htm

That's really great, I really care what some random chart you found online says. Not every situation is exactly the same. If it's a 12-7 game where neither team can move the ball, you probably go for it because you are unlikely to score again. It was obvious in the Louisville game that the scoring was not finished, however, so it would be silly to assume a field goal was going to be all USF would need for the rest of the game.

The only thing that is not subjective is that Holtz's thinking was absolutely vindicated. There was no need to go for two there. They did because the penalty moved the ball closer, I don't have an opinion on whether that makes sense - if anyone has numbers on how likely a team is to get it from 18 feet away instead of 36, I'd like to see it.

if he believed his team had a greater than 17% chance to make it then yes he should have gone for it. doesn't matter how many points you think are left to be scored. it gives you a greater chance to win.

BTW he wasn't vindicated because if he had gone for one and they had made their extra point (98% probability) the score would have been 24-28 and then we would have needed a TD instead of a FG at the end. He was wrong initially and it likely would have cost us at the end. lucky for him he went for 2 and we could have won instead of tied when they missed the extra point.

this is the same guy mind you that sat on the ball and settled for a FG against cincy last year when we had it first and goal from the 2 with 36 seconds left with 2 timeouts. we lost by 3. the difference between a TD and FG would have won the game. the probability of scoring a TD in that exact same scenario is 78%.

Edited October 25, 2012 by Bull94

[sloan1919]

The math is not in Skippers favor on this one. There are basically 3 outcomes:

1) UL scores a field goal

2) UL scores a TD

3) UL doesn't score

if each situation happens and we kicked the PAT (scenario 1)

1) 17 - 24 need 1 TD/PAT to tie.

2) 17 - 28 need 2 TDs to lead.

3) 17 - 21 need 1 TD to lead.

If we went for the 2 and didn't get it (scenario 2)

1) 16 - 24 need 1 TD&2PC to tie.

2) 16 - 28 need 2 TDs to lead.

3) 16 - 21 need 1 TD to lead.

If we went for 2 and got it (scenario 3)

1) 18 - 24 need 1 TD/PAT to lead.

2) 18 - 28 need 1 TD/PAT & FG to tie.

3) 18 - 12 need FG to tie.

In only outcome #1 does Skipper's logic make any sense. Outcome #2 is what actually happened. The only advantage he gets by taking scenario 1 over scenario 2 is that he doesn't have to make a 2pt conversion to tie BUT at this point he has had 2 shots at the 2PC not 1! Meaning that he is giving up ALL the upside of scenario 3 by betting he doesn't get the 2pt conversion at least once in 2 tries. If 2PCs have a 40% success rate there is a 64% he gets it at least 1 time in the two attempts. So basically there is a lot of upside very little downside and there is a 64% chance that he gets out of the downside should the worst happen. This is why the chart says what it says, this is why every coach from high-school to the NFL has a "go for 2 chart".

[Bull94]

The math is not in Skippers favor on this one. There are basically 3 outcomes:

1) UL scores a field goal

2) UL scores a TD

3) UL doesn't score

if each situation happens and we kicked the PAT (scenario 1)

1) 17 - 24 need 1 TD/PAT to tie.

2) 17 - 28 need 2 TDs to lead.

3) 17 - 21 need 1 TD to lead.

If we went for the 2 and didn't get it (scenario 2)

1) 16 - 24 need 1 TD&2PC to tie.

2) 16 - 28 need 2 TDs to lead.

3) 16 - 21 need 1 TD to lead.

If we went for 2 and got it (scenario 3)

1) 18 - 24 need 1 TD/PAT to lead.

2) 18 - 28 need 1 TD/PAT & FG to tie.

3) 18 - 12 need FG to tie.

In only outcome #1 does Skipper's logic make any sense. Outcome #2 is what actually happened. The only advantage he gets by taking scenario 1 over scenario 2 is that he doesn't have to make a 2pt conversion to tie BUT at this point he has had 2 shots at the 2PC not 1! Meaning that he is giving up ALL the upside of scenario 3 by betting he doesn't get the 2pt conversion at least once in 2 tries. If 2PCs have a 40% success rate there is a 64% he gets it at least 1 time in the two attempts. So basically there is a lot of upside very little downside and there is a 64% chance that he gets out of the downside should the worst happen. This is why the chart says what it says, this is why every coach from high-school to the NFL has a "go for 2 chart".

good explanation. that's exactly why they have the chart. it comes down to the math. it gives you the greatest chance to win.

people who play blackjack by their "gut" go broke quicker. people who play by the card give themselves the highest probability for winning. (blackjack will always have a negative expectancy no matter how you play)

[gobulls83]

The math is not in Skippers favor on this one. There are basically 3 outcomes:

1) UL scores a field goal

2) UL scores a TD

3) UL doesn't score

if each situation happens and we kicked the PAT (scenario 1)

1) 17 - 24 need 1 TD/PAT to tie.

2) 17 - 28 need 2 TDs to lead.

3) 17 - 21 need 1 TD to lead.

If we went for the 2 and didn't get it (scenario 2)

1) 16 - 24 need 1 TD&2PC to tie.

2) 16 - 28 need 2 TDs to lead.

3) 16 - 21 need 1 TD to lead.

If we went for 2 and got it (scenario 3)

1) 18 - 24 need 1 TD/PAT to lead.

2) 18 - 28 need 1 TD/PAT & FG to tie.

3) 18 - 12 need FG to tie.

In only outcome #1 does Skipper's logic make any sense. Outcome #2 is what actually happened. The only advantage he gets by taking scenario 1 over scenario 2 is that he doesn't have to make a 2pt conversion to tie BUT at this point he has had 2 shots at the 2PC not 1! Meaning that he is giving up ALL the upside of scenario 3 by betting he doesn't get the 2pt conversion at least once in 2 tries. If 2PCs have a 40% success rate there is a 64% he gets it at least 1 time in the two attempts. So basically there is a lot of upside very little downside and there is a 64% chance that he gets out of the downside should the worst happen. This is why the chart says what it says, this is why every coach from high-school to the NFL has a "go for 2 chart".

No, it is not nearly as predictable as you think it is. There are a ton of other possibilities - for example, in none of your scenarios do you raise the possibility of Louisville missing the extra point, but that's exactly what happened. There could be a safety. A defensive touchdown on the ensuing kickoff. Who knows? There were still eight minutes left, a lot could and did happen.

And your description of what happens if Louisville gets a touchdown is flawed. If Louisville got a touchdown and extra point to get to 28, it wouldn't matter if USF took the two or one - if anything, it is better to take the one. In both cases, USF would need to score a field goal and another touchdown but would need only one two-point conversion. They could take that on the first touchdown, but then if they miss, that means they and the Louisville defense KNOW they have to have two more touchdowns. Taking the one means 11 more points would be needed, leaving a field goal in play. I have always have heard it argued by coaches and analysts that you put the two off till last for this very reason.

And of course, all of this we only know via hindsight. At the moment, all Holtz knew was that there was no reason to assume Louisville's offense wasn't going to score again, so there's no guarantee that getting within a field goal right at that moment would even mean anything, so he initially decided to take the free point. Obviously a yard and a half was enough to change his mind, but USF would have had the lead in the exact same scenario at the end, just leading by one instead of two, which changes nothing.

[Bull94]

The math is not in Skippers favor on this one. There are basically 3 outcomes:

1) UL scores a field goal

2) UL scores a TD

3) UL doesn't score

if each situation happens and we kicked the PAT (scenario 1)

1) 17 - 24 need 1 TD/PAT to tie.

2) 17 - 28 need 2 TDs to lead.

3) 17 - 21 need 1 TD to lead.

If we went for the 2 and didn't get it (scenario 2)

1) 16 - 24 need 1 TD&2PC to tie.

2) 16 - 28 need 2 TDs to lead.

3) 16 - 21 need 1 TD to lead.

If we went for 2 and got it (scenario 3)

1) 18 - 24 need 1 TD/PAT to lead.

2) 18 - 28 need 1 TD/PAT & FG to tie.

3) 18 - 12 need FG to tie.

In only outcome #1 does Skipper's logic make any sense. Outcome #2 is what actually happened. The only advantage he gets by taking scenario 1 over scenario 2 is that he doesn't have to make a 2pt conversion to tie BUT at this point he has had 2 shots at the 2PC not 1! Meaning that he is giving up ALL the upside of scenario 3 by betting he doesn't get the 2pt conversion at least once in 2 tries. If 2PCs have a 40% success rate there is a 64% he gets it at least 1 time in the two attempts. So basically there is a lot of upside very little downside and there is a 64% chance that he gets out of the downside should the worst happen. This is why the chart says what it says, this is why every coach from high-school to the NFL has a "go for 2 chart".

No, it is not nearly as predictable as you think it is. There are a ton of other possibilities - for example, in none of your scenarios do you raise the possibility of Louisville missing the extra point, but that's exactly what happened. There could be a safety. A defensive touchdown on the ensuing kickoff. Who knows? There were still eight minutes left, a lot could and did happen.

And your description of what happens if Louisville gets a touchdown is flawed. If Louisville got a touchdown and extra point to get to 28, it wouldn't matter if USF took the two or one - if anything, it is better to take the one. In both cases, USF would need to score a field goal and another touchdown but would need only one two-point conversion. They could take that on the first touchdown, but then if they miss, that means they and the Louisville defense KNOW they have to have two more touchdowns. Taking the one means 11 more points would be needed, leaving a field goal in play. I have always have heard it argued by coaches and analysts that you put the two off till last for this very reason.

And of course, all of this we only know via hindsight. At the moment, all Holtz knew was that there was no reason to assume Louisville's offense wasn't going to score again, so there's no guarantee that getting within a field goal right at that moment would even mean anything, so he initially decided to take the free point. Obviously a yard and a half was enough to change his mind, but USF would have had the lead in the exact same scenario at the end, just leading by one instead of two, which changes nothing.

these are based on probabilities. he shouldn't play possibilities. he should play probabilities. of course there can be a safety or missed extra point but they aren't likely or probable. he was wrong and so are you. rationalize it all you want but you are wrong.

they would have been losing by 4 at the end if he went for 1 (and louisville made the extra point which is 98% or better). if he goes for one there and makes it we are down by 4. We score another TD so he kicks again to go up 3.

UofL can now tie with a 3 or score a TD (and make extra point)which would force us to score another TD.

he was not playing the odds. he didn't know louisville would miss the extra point. in fact there was a less than 2% chance they would.

the only reason we had a chance to win with a FG at end was because they mssed extra point. otherwise we could score a FG to tie ONLY because he went for 2 and was successful otherwise we must score a TD.

Edited October 25, 2012 by Bull94

[FatDaddyBull]

I was ok with his call. It's really dependent on what you expect from your defense. He expected to allow one more score, hoping it was a field goal... I can't question him much on that.

[Bull94]

I was ok with his call. It's really dependent on what you expect from your defense. He expected to allow one more score, hoping it was a field goal... I can't question him much on that.

he was then playing for a tie. if he wanted a better probability of winning the game(which is the goal) he should have gone for 2. it's really not all that close a call. if he feels his offense has a better than 17% chance of making the 2 point conversion then he should go for it. that's if he is playing probabilities. if the call were closer to 40-45% chance then it becomes a toss up.

coaches should really go for 2 anytime they are up or down by 5 in the 2nd half. they don't trust the math and they know if they go for it and fail then people will blame the coach where if they kick and then lose by one nobody remembers.if you want the odds in your favor then you go for it.

Edited October 25, 2012 by Bull94